The government’s announcement on the expansion of the institution of “certified service providers” is presented as a reform that will accelerate procedures and reduce bureaucracy.
In reality, the government’s policy toward public administration, which is neither neutral nor fragmented, reflects a persistent ideological fixation on shrinking the state and transferring core functions to the market. It does not, under any circumstances, constitute modernization in terms of administrative capacity and effectiveness, but rather a deliberate strategy to achieve the opposite.
Those who today applaud “fast service” through certified professionals seem to overlook the fact that a system is being built in which services that the public sector traditionally provides free of charge are transformed into commodities, citizens into clients and service recipients, and the state into an intermediary.
They are also mistaken if they believe that this policy leads to a better state. It leads to a smaller, weaker, and more dependent state. A state that does not serve citizens, but instead pushes them toward the market to meet basic needs, obligations, and rights.
This represents a form of indirect privatization, without the corresponding political cost.
However, this practice creates a two-speed system, in which citizens with financial means turn to certified professionals and receive rapid service, while those without resources remain trapped in understaffed public offices. We see the same model in healthcare, where the weakening of the public system forces citizens into the “choice” of expensive private solutions.
The public sector itself reproduces bias and unequal treatment. In areas where, through decades of difficulty and effort, a more reliable and rational administration had been established and administrative culture had at least partially changed, practices once considered obsolete are now returning, reinforced and institutionalized.
Moreover, it creates a system in which effective oversight is impossible, and accountability, responsibility, and consequences are undermined in practice.
Greece remains a state with inadequate control mechanisms, limited inspections, weak sanctions, high tolerance for irregularities, high levels of corruption, and clientelism at the core of its functioning.
Today, the state struggles even to supervise its own services. How will it oversee thousands of external collaborators? To whom will they be accountable? When an engineer issues a permit under his or her own responsibility, who actually supervises this process? When and how often are inspections carried out? With what real consequences and sanctions? Who imposes them, and when? Is damage to the public interest remedied? Can affected citizens obtain justice? And against whom are they supposed to take action?
In this context, the delegation of public authority to private actors, which is what is effectively happening, carries serious legal, environmental, economic, and social implications and is institutionally dangerous.
The government chooses to create the illusion of improvement, reform, credibility, and speed. In practice, it weakens an already emaciated state that is steadily losing expertise, experience, operational capacity, and autonomy, opting instead for dependence on professional networks that secure privileged access to public administration, public funds, vast volumes of personal data, and networks of influence.
These are decisions with heavy and difficult-to-reverse consequences.
Instead, the government could choose to invest in structural improvements such as procedural simplification, professionalization of human resources, adequate staffing, reliable and continuous training, and sound legislation.
These interventions would form the core of a serious and sustainable administrative reform, if what we want is a strong, reliable, and capable state.